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ABSTRACT
Preparedness  exercises  play central roles  in 
both the building and assessment of 
organizational readiness  for future 
incidents.  Though processes  for designing 
a n d e v a l u a t i n g e x e r c i s e s  a r e  w e l l 
established,  there are opportunities  to 
improve the  value of exercises  for 
strengthening preparedness and as tools for 
gathering assessment data. This article 
describe the application of systems 
a n a l y t i c a l a p p r o a c h a d a p t e d f r o m 
engineering that examines response 
operations as systems with potential failure 
modes that could hurt performance at future 
incidents.  This  methodology,  which has been 
applied previously to preparedness 
measurement,  is  explored here as  a tool for 
exercise design to focus it more tightly on 
key potential problem areas and to make it 
easier to use exercise data to  explore 
preparedness for incidents that could differ 
considerably from the specific exercised 
scenario.
INTRODUCTION
Preparedness exercises play  a  significant role 
in  the national  preparedness system.  In  the 
Federal  Emergency  Management  Agency’s 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide-101, 
exercises are identified as a  central element 
of an  area’s effort to refine and execute a 
preparedness plan  as well as contributing  to 
red-teaming  efforts to test plans against 
different sets of assumptions. 1  For  medical 
institutions,  periodic exercising  is part of the 
accreditation  requirements imposed by  the 
Joint  Commission  on  Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations.  For rare types of 
incidents or  large-scale  events, use of 
simulated incidents is viewed as particularly 
important, since emergency  response and 
management  personnel are unlikely  to 
encounter  many  of the challenges associated 
with  such  incidents during  their  day-to-day 
activities.  
The general term  preparedness  exercise 
includes activities that fall over  a  wide range 
of scale,  scope, and complexity. Described in 
detail in  the first  volume of guidebooks 
produced by  the Homeland Security  Exercise 
and Evaluation  Program  (HSEEP),  exercise 
can  range from  the most  basic  of seminar-
type interactions up to full-scale response 
simulations where units, equipment  and 
personnel operate as they  would at a  real 
incident  and volunteers serve in  the role of 
victims requiring  treatment  (Figure 1 
illustrates the range of exercise types, in 
order of increasing complexity).  
Figure 1: Varieties of Discussion-based and 
Operations-based Exercises2
As one component of a  preparedness 
program, exercises of these varied types are 
seen  as a  versatile tool that  can  help 
contribute to achieving a  variety  of different 
goals. Though  taxonomies of exercise 
objectives vary  in  the literature,  most include 
the following:3
• Planning  – Exercises provide a  structure 
to advance planning for  a particular 
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incident  scenario,  identifying  problems and 
explore their solutions in focused way.
• Interagency Coordination  – Exercises 
can  act  as a venue for  members of different 
agencies to meet  and interact,  to build 
relationships that are important  to effective 
coordination  in a  real event,  to identify 
issues potentially  falling in gaps of 
authority,  jurisdiction, etc., to test 
m e c h a n i s m s a n d t e c h n o l o g i e s f o r 
interagency  information  sharing  that might 
seldom  be used in  routine events,  and to 
identify  if there are agencies “missing”  from 
plans that  would be needed at a  large scale 
disaster, accident, or terrorist attack.
• Public Education  – Exercises can  act  as 
an  “event”  that, by  being  covered by  the 
media  and discussed publically, makes it 
possible to teach  the public  about  the 
capabilities of response systems, creates the 
opportunity  to educate them  about 
preparedness actions they  could take, and 
informs them  about  preparedness efforts of 
their local, state, or the federal government.  
• Training  – Exercises can  make it possible 
to expose response staff to rare incidents 
and their  unique demands – rather  than 
their  encountering  them  for  the first  time at 
a  real  emergency.  Such  simulations make it 
possible to teach  responders or  volunteers 
specific tasks, practice  equipment  use,  and 
to learn or  refresh  other  knowledge specific 
to an unusual incident.  
• Evaluation  – Exercises have been used to 
evaluate emergency  preparedness activities 
in  a variety  of ways.   Such  evaluations range 
from  very  broad,  qualitative assessments 
(e.g.,  ensuring all significant  issues were 
considered in  planning) to very  detailed, 
quantitat ive studies (e .g . ,  direct ly 
measuring  the patient throughput of a 
medical  facility).  More elaborate and 
realistic evaluative  exercises have the 
potential to assess not just  that a 
preparedness plan  can  be executed,  but 
how  well it  can  be put  into practice under 
the simulated conditions of the exercise 
scenario.
Given  the effort and expense involved in 
designing  them, a single exercise is 
sometimes expected to pursue some or  all  of 
these goals simultaneously.4  This can  be a 
challenge,  since the different goals suggest 
different  priorities and requirements for 
exercise design  that  can  conflict  with  one 
another.  For  example,  the requirement for 
certain  types of realism  could differ 
considerably  between a  training  exercise and 
a focused evaluation drill.  
The published l i terature contains 
examples of exercises focused on  one or more 
of these goals and demonstrations, to varying 
extents,  of how  exercises can  achieve them.5 
Exercises focused on planning  and training 
can  demonstrate issues that were not 
addressed in  existing  plans and, for  training 
efforts, pre-and post-tests of participants can 
show  changes in their  knowledge.6   In 
contrast, using  exercises as tools for 
evaluating  preparedness has been an area  of 
active research  focus,7 and though  it  is clear 
that  the completion  of an  exercise does 
demonstrate something  about  preparedness, 
it  is not always clear  how  much  – or  exactly 
what – has been demonstrated.8
Some of these challenges follow  from 
existing shortfalls in  the ability  to evaluate 
the preparedness of an  organization  or 
jurisdiction. Though  significant  work has 
been  done to develop methods and tools for 
assessing  preparedness for  specific incident 
types or  to deliver  response capabilities of 
interest,  the ability  to effectively  assess 
whether a  particular response system  will 
perform  well  at  a  future incident  is still 
lacking. 9  Measurement  shortfalls create 
challenges for  designing exercises,  since clear 
– and ideally  measurable – preparedness 
outcomes are as important an  input for 
designing training  exercises as they  are for 
framing  exercises whose purpose is 
evaluation.  
In  a  body  of recent  work,10  we have 
explored an  alternative approach  to 
preparedness assessment  based on  applying 
system  reliability  concepts adapted from 
engineering  to response systems. The 
approach  is based on taking  what those 
systems plan  to be able to do and then 
examining  what could go wrong that  might 
prevent them  from  successfully  delivering the 
planned response capacity  at  a  future 
incident.  We define response reliability  as the 
probability  that a response system  will be 
able to deliver  a  specific level of capability  at 
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a  future incident (e.g.,  the ability  to deliver 
mass care to a  population  of 2,000 people for 
a  period of time). A  highly  reliable system 
would have a  high percentage chance of 
successfully  delivering  a  capability  level, 
while a  low  reliability  one might  be very 
unlikely  to do so. Though  the reliability  of 
response systems is a  characteristic that 
appears to be critical for  understanding 
preparedness from  the national to the local 
level – it  answers the fundamental  question 
the public has about  response systems,  “how 
likely  is it that the system  be able to respond 
successfully  to a  future incident” – it is not a 
factor that is currently assessed.11
Examining preparedness exercises, we see 
the concepts that  come out  of thinking 
through  factors that affect  the reliability  of a 
response system  as having  two potential 
applications:
• First,  the logic underlying the analysis 
of a  response system’s reliability  can 
be applied in  exercise design, 
providing a  systematic design 
approach  that can  increase the insight 
that  can  be gained from  exercises 
across the different  types listed in 
Figure 1.
• Second, if appropriately  designed, 
exercises could be very  effective  tools 
for  measuring  the reliability  of a 
response system  – thereby  improving 
the ability to assess preparedness. 12
We see both  these paths as potential 
opportunities to improve the payoff from  the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t m e n t m a d e b y 
organizations and agencies inside and outside 
government  in  preparedness exercises every 
year. 13 Extending  our  analogy  to engineering 
techniques and methods,  these two 
applications are  similar  to the use of these 
approaches at  both  the design  stage of the 
construction  of a  technical system  – to 
identify  and correct  potential  problems 
before they  occur – and in  testing  and 
evaluation of complete technical systems.
In this paper  we explore these two topics, 
rooted in  our  concept of reliable  response 
systems as one of the key  goals for 
preparedness efforts and a  preferred target 
f o r  p r e p a r e d n e s s e v a l u a t i o n . A f t e r 
introducing response reliability  analysis in 
more detail, we examine the application  of 
both  its methods and results in  exercise 
design, and examine how  the logic of 
reliability  assessment  could contributing  to 
better  exercise design across the range of 
exercise goals.  We will then  turn  to how 
exercises can be used as a  primary  evaluation 
tool  to gather  data  to assess a  response 
system’s reliability.  
OVERVIEW OF RESPONSE 
SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The fundamental  approach  of reliability 
analysis is to evaluate a  response system  and 
plans by  systematically  and, if possible, 
quantitatively  analyzing the events and faults 
that  could prevent  it  from  performing as 
planned.  To evaluate response system 
reliability,  we adapted analytical techniques 
developed in  engineering, specifically  fault 
tree analysis and failure mode, effects,  and 
criticality  analysis (FMECA).14  The basic 
steps of a FMECA analysis are:
• Defining and mapping the response 
system, to identify  the different  parts of 
the response operation  and articulate what 
it  means for  them  to function  well.  For 
example,  incident command at  a  response 
could be mapped as made up of several 
parts,  including  building  situational 
awareness about  the incident, making 
decisions about resource allocation  among 
response functions, and dispatching 
response resources.  The system  diagrams 
used for  reliability  analysis are similar  to 
process maps applied in  other  preparedness 
evaluation efforts. 15  To illustrate the types 
of diagrams involved and provide an anchor 
for  later  discussion of their  application  in 
exercise design,  Figure 2  includes an 
example of a  system  model  for  the incident 
command elements of a  generic  response 
based on  recent  analyses we have 
performed.  Complete  examples are 
available in works previously cited.
• Identifying failure modes  that could 
hurt system performance.  Failure 
modes are defined as “the observable 
manners in  which  a component fails,” 16 
which, for  a  response system, would be the 
ways performance in  different  parts of the 
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response system  would break that  would 
h u r t o v e r a l l s y s t e m  p e r f o r m a n c e . 
Identifying fai lure modes involves 
systematically  inventorying  what  might go 
wrong  in  each  part of the system. In  our 
past  work,  we used “classes”  of failures that 
might  produce the same end result  to 
organize the analysis. For  each  part  of the 
system  we looked for  potential failures in 
four  main  classes: (a)  planning  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  ( b ) e q u i p m e n t a n d 
technology, (c) personnel shortfalls and 
h u m a n e r r o r , a n d ( d )  e x t e r n a l 
environmental  causes. Some events or 
b r e a k d o w n s c o u l d h u r t r e s p o n s e 
performance directly, while others might 
only  do so in  combination with other 
failures. Failure modes can  be presented in 
fault  trees that  show  the range of 
breakdowns that could a f fec t  the 
functioning of an  individual part  of a 
response system.  Figure 3  provides an 
example failure tree for  communications 
between on-scene response units and 
incident  command based our  recent  work, 
which  illustrates the different  classes of 
failure modes. The example is included to 
provide a foundation  for  later  discussion  of 
how  such  trees could be used in  designing 
or evaluating exercises.
• Estimate the  probability of different 
failure modes.  Because there are many 
events that  could hurt  the functioning  of a 
response system, one way  to differentiate 
among  potential failure modes is their 
probability  of occurrence.  All other  things 
equal, failure modes that are more common 
will  be of greater  concern  than  less 
common breakdowns.  There are a variety  of 
ways that failure mode likelihoods can be 
estimated,  ranging from  use of real world 
data  to the systematic elicitation  of expert 
opinion.
• Assess  the effects  and severity of 
different failure modes. The other 
characteristic  that differentiates among 
failure modes is their  severity.  For  FMECA, 
severity  is assessed by  asking  what  the 
effect  of the failure is on  overall system 
functioning  – which  for  a  response system 
would be the ability  of to deliver  the 
response capability  it  is designed to provide 
at  an  incident.  Failure modes can  have a 
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Figure 2: Example Portion of Response System Model, Incident Command Components
variety  of effects, ranging from  complete 
failure of the system  (i.e., termination  of a 
response operation) to minor  reductions in 
capability  or  effectiveness.  For  example, 
destruction of an  emergency  operation 
center  in  the course of an  incident  might 
have very  significant  or  even  response 
terminating effect,  while loss of a  few 
response vehicles to breakdowns would cut 
into response capacity to a smaller extent.
Because the focus of this discussion  is not 
the details of the analysis process but  on  the 
relationship with  exercise design  and 
evaluation,  we will not describe the details of 
each  of the steps. 17  Instead, we will walk 
through  the broader  outcomes of reliability 
analysis that relate most  closely  to the later 
sections discussing exercise design.
As illustrated in  Figure 3,  a  realistic 
response system  will  have a  variety  of failure 
m o d e s t h a t  m i g h t o c c u r  – e . g . , 
communications problems, staff shortages, 
traffic  delays that  limit  dispatching of 
resources – whose effects on  response 
operations and on the effectiveness of the 
activities those operations are tasked with 
carrying  out will vary  in magnitude.  For 
example,  for  delivering food aid to victims 
evacuated from  a  disaster, an  area’s plans 
and preparedness efforts will have some 
theoretical maximum  capacity  to provide 
care. For  ease of discussion,  assume a 
maximum  capacity  to feed 1000  people for 
one week. But  that same system  has a  set  of 
failure modes that  could reduce its 
performance when  its response is activated. 
Coordination  problems between  aid 
organizations and response agencies might 
reduce efficiency,  cutting the maximum  by  10 
percent. Damage to key  infrastructures 
during  the incident  (e.g.,  an  aid storage or 
staging area) might  cause more significant 
reductions.  As a  result, at  an  incident  where 
coordination  broke down  but  everything else 
went  as planned,  the system  would be able to 
feed 900 people for  the required week. At 
another  incident,  where multiple failures 
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Figure 3: Example Failure Tree for Communications Between On-Scene Units & Incident Command
occurred,  its performance would be lower  – 
e.g.,  600  people fed – while at  incidents 
where everything went  perfectly  it  could hit  is 
designed capacity of 1,000.
This type of “what-if”  or  “what might  go 
wrong”  analysis is consistent  with  guidance 
i n  d o c u m e n t s s u c h a s F E M A ’ s 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide that 
plans be evaluated for  adequacy, feasibility, 
and acceptability.18 In  particular,  systematic 
assessment of potential  failure modes, their 
likelihood,  and consequences captures the 
CPG direction  that planners “assess whether 
their  organization  can  accomplish  the 
assigned mission  and critical  tasks by  using 
avai lable resources within  the t ime 
contemplated by the plan” as well as that 
Planners  use both  acceptability  and 
feasibility tests to ensure that the 
mission can  be accomplished with 
available resources, without incurring 
excessive risk regarding personnel, 
equipment, materiel, or  time. They  also 
verify  that risk management procedures 
have identified, assessed, and applied 
control  measures to mitigate operational 
risk  (i.e., the risk associated with 
achieving operational objectives).19 
This later  guidance captures not only  the 
importance of assessing  the probability  and 
consequences of different  failure modes,  but 
approaches to deal with them if they occur.
For  a  real system  with  many  failure modes 
(e.g.,  the failure tree include in  Figure 3  was 
one of more than  twenty  crafted to describe a 
realistic  response system), estimates of the 
probability  and consequences of each  failure 
can  provide the basis for simulations of 
response performance.  Rather than  walking 
through  single cases and examining  how  the 
effects of one failure mode or  another  might 
cut into theoretical response performance, 
Monte Carlo simulations of many  cases can 
be done to better  reflect  how  possible failure 
modes affect  the distribution  of its 
performance. The results can be used to 
calculate the probability  that  the system  will 
perform  at  or  above particular  capacity  levels 
or,  put  in our  terms,  its reliability  for 
responding to incidents of different sizes. 
Illustrative reliability  curves that  show 
those probabilities of success for several 
response systems at  increasingly  demanding 
incidents are shown  in  Figure 4.  The dotted 
line shows a  perfectly  reliable system  – since 
nothing  would ever  go wrong  with  the 
system’s functioning, it will  perform  with  100 
percent  reliability  for any  incident  up to its 
maximum  capacity. The light  line shows a 
relatively  unreliable system, which, although 
designed  to deliver  the same level of capacity, 
in  fact would routinely  perform  much  worse. 
The heavy  line shows a  more robust  system, 
which, though  its reliability  drops off as 
incident  size approaches its maximum 
capacity,  is likely  to perform  well  over  a wide 
range of incidents.  All three systems are of 
comparable reliability  at very  small  incidents, 
where each  has so much  slack capacity  that 
even  the system  with  the most  problems is 
still  likely  to hit  the low  required level  of 
performance.
The number  of failure modes a  system  has, 
the probability  of failure, and the scale of 
failure’s effect on  response performance 
determine the shape of these curves. 
Different types of failures (e.g.,  those with  the 
potential to halt  all response operations 
versus capacity  reducing failures) have 
different effects on  the shape of the curves, 
with  their probability  of occurring affecting 
the scale of their  effect. In  previous work, we 
have demonstrated how  these types of curves 
– including their  shape and the area  under 
them  – can provide a  composite measure of 
preparedness (since they  reflect likely 
performance at the full  range of incidents a 
system  might  be called on  to address)  and as 
yardsticks for  comparing different  potential 
preparedness improvements. Since the area 
under these curves provide a  measure of 
aggregate  performance across different  scale 
incidents,  the amount that different 
preparedness interventions are predicted to 
change that area  can  be used to anchor  cost 
effectiveness comparisons among them.20
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Figure 4: Illustrative Reliability Curves for Response Systems with Different Performance Characteristics
USING THE LOGIC UNDERLYING 
RESPONSE RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT TO DESIGN BETTER 
EXERCISES
In  programmatic guidance from  sources such 
as HSEEP, structured approaches for 
developing exercises and designing  multi-
year,  multi-exercise  programs are laid  out  to 
help frame how  goals should be chosen, 
scenarios designed, and the actual tasks of 
exercise development and execution carried 
out.   For  example,  in  HSEEP,  sequential 
steps and conferences are defined that 
identify  and later  flesh  out the “type,  scope, 
objectives and purpose of the exercise,” 21 and 
the write and assemble the materials required 
for  the exercise itself and evaluating  its 
outcomes. 
Key  steps in  this process – which  shape 
the potential  value that  will  be gained from 
actually  planning and running  the exercise – 
include selection  of the portions of the 
r e s p o n s e s y s t e m  a n d t h e r e s p o n s e 
capabilities that  will  be exercised, the nature 
of the scenario that  will provide the 
foundation  for exercising  those capabilities, 
and how  different  injects or  challenges 
throughout the course of the exercise will 
either  test specific  response functions or 
shape the educational or training experience 
of the participants.  Though  exercise design 
doctrine (e.g.,  the HSEEP documents 
referenced previously)  provide processes for 
carrying  out these design  tasks,  good choices 
of such  key  exercise parameters often  depend 
on  the expertise and experience of the 
planners involved. Furthermore,  particularly 
if multiple organizations are involved whose 
priorities for the exercise differ, there may  be 
significant  divergence among participants 
about  the correct  balances to strike in the 
design process.
In  considering  the exercise design process 
– whether  the central  purpose of the exercise 
is training,  planning, or  one of the others 
identified previously  – the logical elements of 
response reliability  analysis could help to 
inform  the choices made during  that process 
and could help to provide a more common 
baseline to design  scenarios and exercise 
events to meet  the needs of all  involved 
organizations.  
• A  system model for  the response 
operation  of interest  (e.g.,  Figure 2) – by 
mapping  out  the “moving  parts”  in  the 
response and capturing  the full range of 
agencies or  other  organizations which 
w o u l d b e i n v o l v e d i n  r e s p o n d i n g 
successfully  – can  help make sure that  key 
response elements (or  the agencies 
responsible) are not left  out  of an  exercise. 
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B y  p r o v i d i n g  a  “ m a p ”  o n  w h i c h 
participating  organizations can  locate their 
functions within  the response,  such  a  model 
can  help provide a  common basis for 
developing a  scenario that  meets the needs 
of all participants.   
• Clear  failure trees  that identify  what 
might  go wrong with  specific  parts of the 
response (e.g., Figure 3) – whether  because 
a  particular  response activity  inherently  has 
many  failure modes or  because it depends 
on  many  other  parts of the response system 
(and is therefore subject to problems that 
might  arise elsewhere)  – can  help guide 
choices of what  functions to exercise.22 
Having  failure trees available to exercise 
designers can  also help to ensure that key 
failure modes aren’t  left  out  when  exercise 
scenarios are designed,  the injects written 
for  scripted exercises,  or  exercise 
evaluation guides prepared to help record 
the key  informational outcomes from  the 
exercise.  In  combination  with  a  response 
system  model,  failure trees for  a  response 
can  also assist in  accurately  interpreting 
exercise results.  Failure modes can also 
provide a common  language and structure 
for  planners and organizations to negotiate 
about  the specifics of exercise injects or 
events to ensure the organizational 
“pressure points”  of interest to all 
participants are covered.
• Data  on  specific failure modes  observed 
in  the jurisdiction’s past  responses can 
similarly  help identify  key  functions that 
might  benefit  from  focused exercising. 
Though  using past experience to guide such 
choices is already  prominent in  exercise 
design  doctrine,  looking  at what failure 
modes occurred (rather  than  focusing  on 
response functions that  encountered 
problems in  past  incidents)  can help 
designers look  across incident  types and 
build more valuable future exercises.  For 
example,  if in  a  past  chemical weapons 
response exercise serious problems were 
observed in  hazmat response, a  planner 
might  conclude that  another  hazardous 
materials exercise was needed.  But, if the 
root  failure mode that caused those 
problems was in  communications or 
incident  command,  it  might  be possible to 
cover  the necessary  material in  a  very 
different  exercise type, creating the 
opportunity  to explore a very  different 
incident  and advance training  goals more 
broadly.
None of the elements from  response 
reliability  analysis would replace steps in 
existing exercise design  processes. However, 
the structure they  provide for  systematically 
thinking  through  what is involved in  a 
response operation and what could disrupt  it 
can  help to make earlier  steps in the exercise 
design  process more straightforward.  At the 
same time, by  laying  out a  “menu”  of the 
choices faced by  exercise designers – from 
what  to test  to the specific  challenges exercise 
participants could be presented with  as a 
scenario evolved – these tools could help to 
ensure that potentially  valuable details are 
not missed in the course of exercise design.
U S I N G E X E R C I S E S T O E V A L U A T E A 
RESPONSE SYSTEM’S RELIABILITY
Though  the logic of reliability  analysis could 
contribute to exercise design,  using exercises 
as evaluation tools to assess the probability 
and consequences of individual  failure modes 
could contribute to actually  measuring  a 
response system’s reliability  – and,  therefore, 
m a k e e x e r c i s e s m o r e e f f e c t i v e a s 
preparedness evaluation tools.
Actually  assessing  the reliability  of a  real 
response system  requires identifying  what 
failure modes could affect  its performance 
and estimating their  probability  and 
consequences for  response performance.  A 
variety  of strategies might be used to do so, 
ranging  from  practitioner  estimation to 
analysis of performance in  past response 
operations. 23 However, for  assessing  levels of 
preparedness, approaches that do not  rely 
either  on  simple estimates or require waiting 
for  a  disaster  to occur  and a  response 
breakdown  to happen  are more attractive.  As 
a  result, preparedness exercises represent  a 
potentially  attractive opportunity  to gather 
information  on response systems’ reliability 
characteristics.  However,  the ability  of 
exercises to support  this type of assessment 
depends on whether  they  are designed to 
measure the information needed.
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The Design of an Exercise Shapes the 
Information It Can Provide
In  thinking  about exercise design, an  analogy 
to the kinds of testing  and assessment  used in 
engineering  – the field where this type of 
analysis was developed – is useful. Just  as we 
would like exercises to discover  or  assess 
problems that  might affect future responses, 
engineers want to discover  problems in  the 
technologies they  design  and build  so steps 
can  be taken to correct  them  before it 
becomes too costly  to do so. As a result, 
different types of testing  and experiments are 
performed on components of such  systems or 
on  models or  prototypes to identify  failure 
modes,  assess their  probability, determine 
their  consequences – and,  in some cases, 
determine how  to maintain  or  service the 
system  to prevent  known  failure modes from 
affecting  performance once it is put  into 
operation.
For  some tests,  systems are evaluated 
under conditions that are very  similar  to what 
they  will be expected to face when  they  are 
actually  used. Put in  a  language more 
relevant  to exercise design, the scenarios the 
systems are subjected to are very  realistic. In 
others tests, conditions are unrealistic by 
design.  Tests subject technologies to very 
high  stress to try  to cause failures more 
quickly  (to limit  the amount of time and 
money  that  must  be spent  testing).  In  other 
tests, specific failures are caused directly  – 
and the focus of the  test  is on assessing  the 
consequences.  
It is intuitive that  exactly  how  a  test is 
designed drives what information  it  can 
provide. Tests that  cause failures directly  can 
tell you  nothing  about  the probability  that  a 
failure will  occur, but may  provide very  good 
information  on  what happens when it  does. 
To get information about the probability  of a 
breakdown  from  a  test  that uses highly 
stressful  conditions (e.g.,  testing  something 
at  a  very  high  temperature to make it fail 
more quickly),  the tester  needs to know  how 
to relate those conditions to what  might  exist 
under realistic  circumstances.  Tests that  are 
done under  entirely  realistic  conditions might 
provide both  probability  and consequence 
information, but might be very  expensive to 
carry  out  (e.g.,  requiring  testing  a  prototype 
computer  for  months of continuous use until 
it begins to break.)
Exactly  the same logic  applies to exercises 
and the sorts of tradeoffs that  exist  between 
design  choices and the information  content of 
their  results.  For  example, there might  be 
design  choices that  are advantageous from 
some perspectives (e.g., reduce the cost  of the 
exercise),  but might  also reduce the 
information  the exercise produces.  Just  as 
different diagnostic  tests are performed on 
technical  systems to get different  types of 
information, there could be very  good 
reasons to run exercises that  might  not 
provide a  complete picture of a  response 
system  – but, in  that case, that  understanding 
must  be carried through  to evaluating  the 
outcomes the exercise does produce. To help 
illustrate these tradeoffs, we will use exercise 
realism  as a  way  of working through  some 
key  design choices and exploring how  they 
affect  the information  content  of the “test 
results” provided by the exercise.
The “Realistic Exercise” as the Gold 
Standard
In policy  discussion about  preparedness 
exercises,  “realistic” exercises are frequently 
put  forward as the standard that  exercise 
designers should target.  For  example, in 
testimony  and analyses by  the Government 
Accountability  Office (GAO) in  the years 
since 2001,24 the need for  realistic exercises 
has been  emphasized, a  finding echoed in 
outside analyses of national preparedness 
efforts.25  The requirement  for  realism  has 
even  been  embedded in  legislation,  with 
PKEMRA stating  that  exercises “as realistic 
as practicable.” 26 Unsurprisingly, this call  for 
realism  is embedded in  exercise design 
doctrine. 27 
From  the perspective of response 
reliability  analysis, realistic  exercises are 
attractive.  Most importantly, the more 
realistic  an  exercise’s scenario the more likely 
it  will  reflect the full range of possible failure 
m o d e s t h a t c o u l d a f f e c t  r e s p o n s e 
performance (see Figure 3).  The concern  that 
unrealistic exercises omit  important  elements 
that  could affect  performance has been raised 
as a general issue in  previous policy 
analyses,28 and in  the specific  examination  of 
individual exercises and their  results.29 
Furthermore,  analogous to testing a  piece of 
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technology  under its real-life “operating 
conditions,”  the occurrence of failures during 
a  realistic exercise is easy  to relate to their 
potential to occur  at  an  actual incident and 
their  consequences should similarly  provide 
direct insight  into how  they  would reduce 
performance at a future response.
Roles for Less-Than-Realistic Exercises
Even  as policy  and doctrinal sources advocate 
for  realistic exercises,  they  acknowledge the 
potential utility  of exercises that  are less 
realistic  as well.  For  example, both  GAO and 
Congress (in  published analyses and 
testimony)  suggest  scenarios should be 
intense enough, in  the words of the GAO,  to 
stress response systems “to the breaking 
point  if possible.” 30 Returning  to the exercise 
goals discussed in the introduction,  there 
may  also be good reasons why  a training 
exercise would intentionally  be unrealistic  in 
some ways to better  focus training efforts on 
the key  points participants are expected to 
take away  from  the experience.  Variations in 
realism  are unavoidable if an exercise 
program  includes activities ranging  from 
seminars to full-scale exercises (Figure 1) and 
often  realism  is relaxed for  valid cost and 
other concerns. To oversimplify  somewhat, 
more realism  usually  corresponds to a  more 
expensive exercise.  
Though  both  exercise design  doctrine and 
the literature include discussion  of exercises 
of varying levels of realism, we could not  find 
a  systematic examination  of the different 
ways the realism  of an  exercise is “relaxed” 
and how  the different options affect  the 
potential value of the information  coming  out 
of an  exercise. Particularly  if one goal  of an 
exercise is assessing  preparedness, a  clear 
understanding  of what  types of evaluation 
information  can  be obtained from  exercises 
designed for different levels of realism.
Examining both  the literature on  exercises 
and drawing on our  earlier  discussion of test 
design  in engineering, we will look  at  four 
different ways that realism  is relaxed in 
exercises and explore what evaluation 
information  – specifically  data  for  reliability 
assessment – can be obtained in each case.  
• Different Exercise Types. Exercises 
conducted around a  conference table or in 
a  seminar  room  (Figure 1)31  are, by 
definition,  less realistic  than  full-scale 
o p e r a t i o n a l e x e r c i s e s .  F r o m  t h e 
perspective of viewing  exercises as 
preparedness assessment tools, the 
concern  is how  different  designs may  – 
intentionally  or  unintentionally  – 
foreclose the possibility  of failure  modes 
occurring  that  could significantly  affect 
performance at a real incident.  
A  very  tangible example of this 
possibility  is that exercises that do not 
involve physically  deploying  people or 
response resources may  not  cover  failure 
modes like vehicles breaking  down  or 
identify  differences between  assumed 
deployment  rates and what  is actually 
realistically  achievable.  Another,  subtler, 
example of this issue is addressed in 
HSEEP guidance: “The level of detail 
provided in  a  scenario should reflect  real-
w o r l d u n c e r t a i n t y . I n c l u s i o n  o f 
superfluous information, or  ‘white noise,’ 
is a  variable that  should be discussed and 
agreed upon  by  the exercise planning 
team.” 32 It  would presumably  be easy  for 
an  exercise planner  who was focused on 
building  a  clear  and high  quality  tabletop 
exercise scenario to leave out  the fact  that 
real-world information  flows are often 
confusing. If omitted, then the possibility 
of incorrect information  affecting 
command decision-making would not  be 
addressed – and the exercise would be 
blind to an  important command-level 
failure mode.
This is not  to say, however,  that 
exercises that  only  capture a  subset  of 
failure modes cannot provide some data 
to support  assessment  of a  response 
system’s reliabil ity.  Though  such 
scenarios might omit  some ways 
performance could break down, as long  as 
their  omission  is unlikely  to distort  the 
occurrence of other  failure  modes (or 
those effects can  be understood and taken 
into account),  such exercises can  provide 
useful data  on the failure modes that are 
included. Failure modes that are 
particularly  high  probability  (e.g., major 
planning  shortfalls) may  be quite likely  to 
be identified in  such  exercises.  When 
interpreting the results of such  an 
exercise,  it  is important  not  to fall  into the 
trap of drawing conclusions about failure 
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modes that were not included in  the 
scenario (or  the overall performance of 
the response system) – since the fact  that 
they  were not  observed when  the exercise 
was run  was a  result of its design, and had 
little to do with  the characteristics of the 
response system being evaluated.
With  respect  to assessing  the potential 
consequences of individual  failure modes, 
less realistic exercises can provide more 
limited information.  For  example,  a  table 
top exercise might  be used as a  venue to 
explore the consequences of identified 
failure modes – though doing  so would 
require additional analysis or  assessment 
since they  could not  simply  be observed 
directly  (as might be the case  in  a  full 
scale operational exercise). 33
• High Stress  Exercises.  In both  the 
GAO report and legislation  cited above, 
exercises that  stressed response systems, 
potentially  to their  breaking  point, were 
highlighted. Such  exercises – similar  to a 
“high  temperature”  test of a  technological 
system  – increase the chance that  failure 
modes will  be detected because of the 
demanding and hostile testing  conditions. 
From  the perspective of observing failure 
modes, such  demanding exercises are 
very  attractive. If an  exercise was run 
under entirely  realistic  conditions, it is 
entirely  possible that no failure modes (or 
at  least none of much  consequence) 
would be observed.  Though  that 
observation  would still provide useful 
data about the response system’s 
performance, it  would be less useful from 
the perspective of considering  future 
strategies to strengthen preparedness.  
Highly  stressful exercise scenarios 
increase the chance that breakdowns will 
be observed in the course of the exercise 
either because the demands of the 
scenario make failure modes more likely 
or  because the consequences of their 
occurring  are more obvious.  Identifying 
what  breaks (and when) under  stressful 
conditions can help  to identify  “weaker 
links”  in the response system  (Figure 2). 
This can  be advantageous for  identifying 
failures that might not have been 
anticipated before the exercise was run 
(e .g . ,  p lanners bel ieved incident 
command activities would function well, 
but during a stressful scenario situational 
awareness broke down).  
Relating the results of a  high  stress 
exercise back  to an  understanding  of 
system  performance under  more normal 
conditions requires breaking  out the 
nature of the stress and how  it  likely 
affects the occurrence of system  failure 
modes.  If the scale of the exercise 
scenario is within the system’s expected 
capabilities – i.e.,  looking  at  Figure 4,  it  is 
an  incident whose requirements fall to 
the right of the  graph, but do not  exceed 
the maximum  planned capacity  of the 
system  – then no further  analysis is 
needed.34  
However,  if the exercise scenario was 
intentionally  selected to fall  above (or  far 
above) the maximum  planned capacity  of 
the system,35  then it  is likely  that  the 
overwhelming  nature of the event  could 
change the probability  and consequences 
of failure modes occurring – and so 
relating  the observations back  to the 
system’s expected performance at smaller 
scale incidents would have to be done 
with  care.   It may  be the case that  the fact 
that  particular  failures were observed in 
these scenarios indicates they  would be 
problems for smaller  incidents as well, 
but before drawing that  conclusion a 
critical examination  must be done to 
determine if the stress level  of the 
exercise makes doing so impossible. 
• Exercise Scenarios  Which Force 
Failures to Occur. In the design  of 
exercises,  scripted series of events are 
frequently  used to ensure that  the 
participating  response organizations test 
the response capabilities or  explore the 
policy  issues the exercise was planned to 
address.  The “injects”  that are included as 
part of an  exercise  scenario could include 
potential failure modes occurring in  a 
scripted way  – e.g.,  an  exercise inject 
stating  that the communications system 
has broken down,  certain  supplies are 
running  out, etc.  In  such  situations, part 
of what the exercise is testing  is the ability 
of the participants to adapt or  improvise 
and prevent the potential failure from 
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becoming  an  actual failure  with  an 
impact on response performance.  
There are real limits to conclusions 
that  can  be drawn  about  the probabilities 
of different  failures based on  the outcome 
of such  an  exercise.  Since a  failure was 
“forced”  in  the scenario,  its occurrence 
has no information  content.36   However, 
the extent  to which  the response system 
was able to adapt  to the failure and 
mit igate i t s impact  on  response 
performance is informative. The ability  of 
a  response system  to prevent  a  potential 
failure from  affecting  performance does 
provide some evidence that  the system’s 
performance is less likely  to be affected by 
that  failure mode at an  actual incident. 37 
Furthermore,  even if the response system 
cannot adapt  to a  forced failure,  such  an 
approach  could be very  useful for 
assessing  the consequences of individual 
failure  modes since evaluation  could 
focus on  gathering  data  of interest 
immediately  after  the scripted (and 
therefore anticipated by  the evaluation 
team) failure occurred (discussed below)
• Exercises Testing Parts  of Response 
Systems in Isolation. Finally,  some 
exercises – notably  drills of specific 
response functions –are designed to test 
p i e c e s o f t h e r e s p o n s e s y s t e m 
individually.  Though  such focus can  allow 
more detailed examination of parts of the 
response,38  understanding how  what  is 
observed in  a  drill  relates to response 
per formance overa l l depends on 
understanding  the effects of isolating  it. 
For  example, such  isolation  will leave out 
failure modes caused by  linkages to other 
pieces of the response system  (Figure 3, 
arrows entering  the tree at the top).  If the 
effects of these failures are understood 
and potentially  simulated as part of the 
focused exercise,  then  it  might  be possible 
to make inferences about system 
performance from  problems observed in 
the drill.  For  assessing  the consequences 
of individual failure modes,  the “linkages 
out”  – how  performance in  the function 
being exercised relates to the rest  of the 
system  – must  be taken into account.   All 
other things being equal,  a  breakdown 
that  has the potential to affect  many  other 
parts of the response system  will  be more 
consequential than one that does not.   
Though  potentially  not  as comprehensive 
as realistic  response exercises, those in  which 
reality  has been  relaxed in  various ways can 
still  provide insights useful for assessing a 
response system’s reliability  characteristics. 
Furthermore,  the systematic thought process 
about  what an  individual exercise is testing, 
which  reliability  analysis provides,  helps to 
interpret exercise results more generally  and 
draw  conclusions about what  specific 
exercises can  reveal about  preparedness. 
Particular  exercise designs – e.g.,  those that 
look at  “forced failures”  or  individual  parts of 
the response systems – may  be very  attractive 
for  some exercise goals.  But by  helping  to 
identify  what types of evaluation data  can  still 
be extracted from  the results of such 
exercises,  this approach  can  help to increase 
the potential  value of individual  exercises and 
their  ability  to pursue multiple exercise goals 
simultaneously.
GENERALIZING FROM EXERCISE 
RESULTS TO DESCRIBE 
RESPONSE RELIABILITY
Exercises of various designs can  clearly 
provide an  approach to collecting  data  on  a 
response system’s reliability  characteristics. 
Either  in  a  realistic or  an appropriately 
crafted less-than-realistic  exercise, the 
observation  of a  failure mode with  non-trivial 
consequences for response performance 
provides one data  point for  reliability 
a n a l y s i s .  C o m p a r i s o n o f a b s o l u t e 
performance in  an  exercise (e.g., the number 
of people evacuated in  a  given  time)  with 
planning  assumptions for  that capability  can 
both  help characterize the consequences of 
observed failures and suggest  the presence of 
failure modes that may  have occurred but not 
been  recorded in  exercise evaluation. Both 
these approaches can contribute to 
identifying  failure modes that  affect a  system, 
observe the occurrence of some of those 
modes during  a  particular  scenario,  and 
explore their consequences.  
In  considering  the overall reliability  of a 
response system, there is still a ways between 
the results of one exercise and the type of 
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reliability  curves shown  at  the beginning of 
this article.  Just as we drew  a contrast 
between  a  single observation of a  response 
system  and simulation of many  cases – which 
made it  possible to draw  the type of reliability 
curves shown in  Figure 4  – one exercise 
represents essentially  one observation  of a 
system.  Because the occurrence of failure 
modes is a probabilistic  process – a  system 
failure of modest  probability  will occur  in 
some responses but  not  others – drawing 
more general conclusions about  system 
reliability requires more than one data point.
As a  result,  an  exercise driven  assessment 
of a  response system’s reliability  is best 
considered a  target  of an  entire exercise 
program, where the results of multiple 
exercises – and the experience in  actual 
incidents as well – are combined to identify 
failure modes that occur  more frequently 
than  others or ones whose consequences 
appear  more consistently  serious.  To build 
that  composite picture, individual failure 
modes provide a  common  framework to link 
the occurrence of – for  example,  command 
and control  problems – from  tabletop 
exercises on unconventional weapons 
scenarios to an  operational exercise on 
responding to a  hurricane. Such  an  analytical 
model would fit  readily  into existing  guidance 
on corrective action programs that are 
designed to capture the improvements 
identified in  past  exercises and assist  in 
prioritizing among those improvements and 
allocating  time and resources to those that 
are more common,  more consequential, or  a 
combination of both.
CONCLUSIONS
In  efforts both  to assess and improve national 
preparedness, exercises occupy  a  prominent 
place in  both  policy  and practitioner  thinking. 
When an  exercise is successfully  completed, 
the results are cited as a  demonstration  of 
preparedness. When  a  response operation 
does not go as expected,  more – or  different  – 
exercise regimens are often  cited as part  of 
the solution  to improve preparedness.  In 
some cases, past exercise experiences are 
cited as evidence that lessons that “should 
have been learned”  were not  absorbed, and 
changes in exercising  and preparedness 
efforts demanded as a result.
The weight  given  to exercises,  and the 
frequency  with  which  they  are run, make 
understanding  how  to get  the most  value out 
of these activities an important  topic that 
merits analytic attention. Numerous 
programs require exercising  as part of 
preparedness efforts for  a  range of hazards, 
and the amount  of money  devoted to meeting 
those requirements is considerable. 
Improvements to exercise design  that 
strengthen  their  effectiveness for  evaluation 
or  other  goals – particularly  improvements 
that  can  be made that  do not  increase the 
costs of individual exercises – will  increase 
the return on that substantial investment.
In  this article,  we have discussed how 
response reliability  analysis – systematically 
looking  at  response operations at systems 
and assessing what might  go wrong  that 
would hurt  their  performance – can  be 
applied to exercise design.  Because of the 
need to improve efforts to measure 
emergency  preparedness, we focused 
primarily  on  how  exercises can  be used to 
collect  the information  needed to assess the 
probability  and consequences of different 
failure modes that could prevent  a  response 
system  from  responding  effectively  to a 
future incident. Though highly  realistic 
exercises are potentially  very  useful for  that 
assessment, exercises that  relax  realism  in  a 
d i f f e r e n t  w a y s c a n  p r o d u c e u s e f u l 
information  as well.   Just as tests of 
technological systems are done under  both 
realistic and intentionally  unrealistic 
circumstances,  exercise tests of response 
systems can  – and should – be conducted in 
this manner as well. However,  when exercises 
are run  where realism  has been relaxed in 
different ways,  the limits on  the information 
obtained must be recognized – and the 
framework provided by  response reliability 
analysis can help to ensure that  the 
conclusions drawn  from  results neither  over- 
nor understate what  the  exercise revealed 
about  the preparedness of the response 
system being tested.
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